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Research and Analysis Branch

THE GERMAN POSITION IN SCANDINAVIA

~~Report No. 39~~

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April 22, 1942

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MILITARY FORCES

GERMAN	FINNISH
INFANTRY DIVISION	INFANTRY DIVISION
MOUNTAIN DIVISION	CAVALRY BRIGADE
TODT BATTALION	INFANTRY BATTALION

GERMAN AIR FORCE
(Figures represent air strength at main bases only)

AIRDROME

FINNISH-RUSSIAN FRONT, MAR. 25, 1942

RAILROADS

- 1.524 METER GAUGE SINGLE TRACK
- 1.524 " " DOUBLE TRACK
- 1.524 " " DOUBLE TRACKING IN PROCESS
- 1.524 " " ELECTRIFIED
- 1.435 METER GAUGE
- " " ELECTRIFIED
- 1.067 METER GAUGE

MOTOR ROADS

- MAIN ROUTES
- UNDER CONSTRUCTION
- CANAL

12 Coastal Patrol Planes

33 Long Range and Recann. Bombers
9 Dive Bombers

9 Dive Bombers
10 Fighters

80 Long Range and Recann. Bombers
60 Fighters
15 Coastal Patrol Planes

10 Fighters

75 Long Range and Recann. Bombers
35 Fighters
12 Coastal Patrol Planes

10 Fighters

5th AIR FLEET

IN RESERVE POSITION UNKNOWN

SMALL FINNISH UNITS

0 50 100 200 MI
0 50 100 200 300 KM

NORTH CAPE
Vardö
Vadsö
VARANGER FJORD
RYBACHI PEN.
Alta
Kirkenes
Petsamo
Polyarnoe
Murmansk
Kola
CAPE SVYATOI NOS
KOLA PENINSULA
Tromsö
Bardu
Harstad
Narvik
Polajärvensuu
Kandalaksha
Bodö
Rovaniemi
Mosjöen
Kemi
Tornio
Taivalkoski
Luleå
Archangel
Molotovsk
Belomorsk
Onega
Obozerskaya
Nerla Dvina R.
to Kotlas
Namsos
Trondheim
TRONDHEIM FJORD
Roros
Vaasa
Petrozavodsk
Kanosha
to Velsk
Belozersk
Vologda
Stavanger
Haugesund
Bergen
OSLO
Horten
Turku (Åbo)
HELSINKI
LENINGRAD
LAKE LADOGA
GULF OF FINLAND
STOCKHOLM
Lista
Mandal
Kristiansand

4° 0° 4° 8° 12° 16° 20° 24° 28° 32° 36° 40° 44° 48°
68° 66° 64° 62° 60° 58°

ARCTIC OCEAN
NORWEGIAN SEA
GULF OF BOTHNIA
BALTIC SEA
WHITE SEA

MAP NO. 422 APRIL 10, 1942

DRAWN IN THE GEOGRAPHIC DIVISION, C.O.I.

THE GERMAN POSITION IN SCANDINAVIA

I. INTRODUCTION

In 1940, the securing of the German military and economic position in Scandinavia was preliminary to the launching of the offensive in the West. Since that time Scandinavia has played an important role in the war: The resources of the region have contributed substantially to German military production, Norwegian air and naval bases have served in operations against Britain and the Allied lines of supply, and Finland's bases and armed forces have been employed against Russia. Between February and April 1942 it is believed that German forces in the area have been reenforced to the extent of three divisions, powerful naval units are now based at Trondheim, and large-scale bombing operations have been conducted against Murmansk. These movements, at a time when Germany is attempting to husband and concentrate its armed strength, probably reflects some concern about the vulnerability of Scandinavia to Allied attack. The scale of recent Anglo-American shipments to Russia has, further, increased the immediate importance of Northern Scandinavia to the belligerents. At the same time, Norway's restiveness under occupation, Sweden's reluctance to commit herself to the New Order, and Finland's disappointment at the German failure to achieve quick victory in the East have accentuated the underlying weakness of Germany's political hold on the Continent.

Scandinavia thus represents an area in which Germany has major military, political, and economic stakes, and one where recent events have placed Germany increasingly on the defensive. It is the purpose of this report to survey the present German position in Scandinavia: the location of German forces and the quality of the transport routes available for their supply; the size and significance of the German economic stake; and the political forces currently at work in Sweden, Norway, and Finland.

II. TRANSPORT FACILITIES IN SCANDINAVIA

The strategic position of Norway is largely determined by its geography. The most sparsely populated region of Europe, its 124,556 square miles contain a population of only 2,907,000. An overwhelming proportion of the population, the major cities, industry and the railway net are concentrated in the area south of Trondheim. From Kristiansand, near the southern tip of Norway, to the North Cape it is, by air, fully 1000 miles; from Trondheim to North Cape it is more than 700 miles. The control of Norway as a whole passes, in most circumstances, to the power controlling the region south of Trondheim: an area only some 300 miles long, and from 75 to 250 miles wide.

This circumstance is reenforced by the relation that exists between the major ports and the railway system. Namsos, Trondheim, Aandalsnes, Bergen, and Kristiansand are all linked by rail to Oslo; the backbone of the rail system being the line from Oslo to Trondheim, from which routes branch to the western ports. In essence the German campaign of April 1940 consisted in an effort to link these two cities. When German control of the Oslo-Trondheim line was assured, by the fall of Roros, Tynst, and Dombas, the Allies withdrew from the whole of southern Norway.[1]

Northeast of Trondheim and Namsos stretches a barren narrow coastal area, that curves to a common border with Sweden and Finland, at a point close to the western boundary of Russia. Economically this area is significant because of Petsamo's nickel mine and smelter, and the iron ore mined in Swedish Lapland and at Sydvaranger in Norway. The northern region is normally supplied by sea. It has, however, two basic overland links to southern Scandinavia: the rail line that branches from Sweden to Narvik, and the so-called Arctic Highway that winds north from the Finnish railhead at Rovaniemi to Petsamo. The road net that links the key points between Narvik and Petsamo has been extended and improved in the past year, but it remains relatively primitive. Similarly, the road that runs north from Namsos to Narvik -- broken by several ferries -- can not be regarded as a military highway of major importance.

1/ See "The German Occupation of Norway", Information Bulletin, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Naval Intelligence, September 1940, Chapter VIII, especially pp. 76 - 84.

The rail facilities of southern Norway and Finland, combined with German control of the Baltic, afford ample facilities for the supply and reenforcement of Axis troops south of Namsos and Rovaniemi, without recourse to the transport facilities of Sweden. The Swedish railways, nevertheless, are, potentially, of considerable auxilliary value to the Germans in case of hostilities in Southern Scandinavia. The Swedish railway to Narvik would be of major importance to the Germans in case of hostilities in that sector.

From the perspective of transport facilities Southern Scandinavia may, then, be distinguished from the northern region. German control of the Baltic makes Southern Scandinavia, for both military and economic purposes, easily and continuously accessible to the Continent.[1] The long arc from Namsos to Varanger Fjord, however, is normally dependent on an exposed shipping lane. Alternative to this is the Swedish railway to Narvik and the Rovaniemi-Petsamo Highway, supplemented by a tenuous road network connecting Narvik, Tromso, Alta, Kirkenes, and Petsamo. Air transport and the Namsos-Narvik road must be regarded as emergency facilities, at best.

1/ In general Stockholm and Scandinavian ports to the South are ice-free throughout the year, although ice-breakers are occasionally required at Stockholm. Turku, on the Gulf of Finland, is normally ice-bound from December to April; Oulu is closed from November to the end of May; Harnosand and Helsinki from January to March, with icebreakers required at Helsinki throughout January and April.

III. THE ORDER OF BATTLE IN SCANDINAVIA

The location of German forces in Norway and in Finland clearly reflects the character of the transport net available. Six divisions are concentrated in Southern Norway, within range of the Norwegian rail lines; five divisions are in north-central Finland, close to the ports at the head of the Gulf of Bothnia or the rail line that branches from those ports northeast, towards the Russian border. Three divisions have been placed in the far north, in the Petsamo-Kirkenes sector, which are now partially supplied by the long sea route, but which have, as well, the Arctic Highway and subsidiary roads on which to rely. Only single divisions have been located in the intervening area - at Mosjoen, Narvik, and Alta.

German divisions are believed to be distributed as follows throughout Norway (as of April 10, 1942):

	DIVISIONS
Kirkenes	2d Mt.
Alta	702nd
Narvik	199th
Mosjoen	196th
Trondheim	181st
Bergen	96th
	69th
Stavanger	214th
Oslo	710th
Roros	3d Mt.

Since February 16, 1942, the 199th Division and the 2d and 3d Mountain Divisions have been added to the German forces in Norway. In all, 9-10 German divisions are believed to be in Finland, of which two are stationed in the Petsamo region, and five further south, between Tornio and Salla. A part of this force might be moved over the Arctic Highway in support of the divisions in the north.

As indicated in the accompanying table, German air strength in Norway is largely concentrated at Stavanger and Trondheim, with small units scattered elsewhere. In all some 370 planes at present operate out of Norwegian bases. The four major and eight minor airfields in Northern Norway are capable of supporting many more than the 73 aircraft now reported at Bodo, Bardufoss, and Tromso. A full air fleet (the Fifth) is reported in the triangle Kirkenes-Palojoensu-Rovaniemi; although it is believed by MID that only 300 planes are operating there.

Table 1. Distribution of German Aircraft in Norway

	Bombers			*Fighters*		*Coastal*
	Long Range	Recon.	Dive	1-Engine	2-Engine	
BARDUFOSS	30	3	9	0	0	0
BODO	0	0	9	10	0	0
HERDIA	0	0	0	0	10	0
KRISTIANSAND) LISTA)	0	0	0	0	10	0
STAVANGER	60	15	0	20	15	12
TROMSO	0	0	0	0	0	12
TRONDHEIM	71	9	0	30	30	15
	161	27	18	60	65	39

The major German naval units now operating along the western coast of Norway are the battleship *Tirpitz*, the pocket battleship *Admiral Scheer*, and the cruiser *Prinz Eugen*. They are believed to have a complement of at least eight destroyers.

The armed forces of Sweden include, at maximum mobilization, about 400,000 men. A lack of full equipment and divisional organization for all units might lower Sweden's effective force somewhat below this level, in case of war. The artillery and tank equipment of Sweden are believed to have been substantially increased in the past two years. The Swedish Air Force is believed to total 367 planes, largely older types of German, Italian, British, and American craft. Sweden commands a considerable navy, although it lacks modern battleships.

As indicated in the map facing page 1, Finland has mobilized some 16 infantry divisions, one cavalry brigade, three infantry brigades (in the north), and some small forces on the line above Leningrad. A recent report indicates that demobilizations have been only partly compensated for by the calling up of new troops, lowering effective Finnish strength to 14 divisions. The ground forces have been inactive for some time, and there is considerable doubt as to whether Finland will undertake extensive offensive operations in the course of 1942.

IV. SCANDINAVIA AND THE GERMAN WAR ECONOMY

The mineral and timber resources, manufactured products, and, to some extent, foodstuffs of Scandinavia are now being exported to Germany. Although, in return, Germany sends some commodities to the area, notably coal and pig iron to Sweden, and foodstuffs to Finland, the balance is heavily in her favor. It is not, however, the size of Germany's favorable trade balance, but rather the strategic nature of several Scandinavian products that makes the area of major importance to the German economy.

It is difficult to measure precisely Germany's actual imports from Scandinavia, or her actual total consumption of strategic materials. As a rough approximation, however, the following table, giving the proportion of mineral production (1940) under Axis control that lies in Scandinavia, measures the relative importance of Norwegian, Swedish, and Finnish minerals to the German war economy. Only strategic minerals, present in significant quantity, are included.

	Per cent of Total European Axis Supply in Scandinavia	
Iron Ore	18	(excludes Ukraine)
Molybdenum	22	(reported increased, 1941-42)
Tungsten	10	
Nickel	37	(excludes Petsamo)
Copper	29	
Aluminum	5 - 10	
Pyrites	40	

Iron Ore. There is, in the area controlled by Germany, no shortage of iron ore. In the Ukraine alone Germany holds resources, probably unused, which have produced fully 16 million tons a year. The iron ore of Sweden, now believed going to Germany at a rate of 12 million tons per year, is nevertheless important to the German war economy. The Swedish ores are notably free of sulphur and are of high metallic content, averaging about 60 per cent as opposed, for example, to the 35 per cent average of French ores. Their conversion to steel therefore involves important savings in coke and manganese, both of which are relatively scarce in Germany. It is believed, further, that German furnaces have been specially adjusted to deal with the Swedish ores, and that their conversion would involve perhaps considerable loss of time and efficiency. The expansion of iron ore supply from resources now unused would be expensive in transport facilities, labor, and capital equipment, which Germany can not easily afford. In short, the advantages

STRATEGIC MINERALS IN SCANDINAVIA



APPROXIMATE PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL EUROPEAN AXIS SUPPLY IN SCANDINAVIA

to Germany of the present flow of Swedish iron ore are considerable, despite the availability of alternative sources on the Continent.

Molybdenum. German technology has successfully worked towards a high degree of flexibility in the use of the steel-hardening alloys, in which the relatively more abundant types have been substituted for the relatively more scarce. The total stock of alloys available, after full exploitation of Continental sources, is believed barely adequate for German needs. In the substitutions that have occurred molybdenum has played an increasing role. The Scandinavian sources, amounting to at least 22 per cent of the total German supply, are thus of prime importance; and if recent reports of large scale increases in Norwegian output are correct, Germany's stake in Scandinavia has been significantly enhanced.

Nickel. Norwegian nickel production (1,250 tons) normally constitutes about one-third of the total Continental supply. According to latest reports at least 5,000 tons of nickel (metal content) and possibly 10,000 tons will be exported, in addition, from the nickel mine and smelter in the Petsamo district of Finland in 1942. This amount is so substantial in relation to current German consumption that it may significantly ease Germany's tight position with respect to the steel-hardening alloys.

Copper. As in the case of the steel-hardening alloys, the German position with respect to copper is barely adequate. The loss of the copper now flowing from each of the Scandinavian areas, amounting perhaps, to 30 per cent of the total current German supply, might then have wide repercussions on the whole war economy. Recent reports indicate an expansion in copper mining activity in Norway and Finland, which has raised the absolute, and possibly the relative contribution of Scandinavia to the German copper supply.

Aluminum. German controlled production of virgin aluminum for 1942 is estimated at about 500,000 tons. In pre-war years Norway produced about 30,000 tons of aluminum, while the war cut 1940 production to about half that figure. Under normal circumstances, therefore, the Norwegian supply would not be counted a major element in the German aluminum position. In the early months of 1941, however, Germany apparently planned a large scale expansion in the Norwegian aluminum industry, designed to employ the cheap hydro-electric power available there. But later reports indicate the virtual abandonment of the grandiose expansion scheme. Germany now appears to have centered in

Hungary a considerable part of its new investment in the aluminum industry. The loss of Norwegian aluminum would not, therefore, constitute a serious embarrassment to Germany, especially since the intermediate product alumina, rather than metallic aluminum, is the principal limitation on Germany's considerable production. Norway's production of alumina is inconsiderable, and the use of Norway's aluminum capacity has involved some export of alumina from the Continent.

Pyrites. The sources of pyrites, and thus sulphur, which are available to Germany are ample. Major deposits are located in Germany, Italy, Spain, and Portugal; lesser amounts are normally exported by France, Algeria, Poland, and Yugoslavia. Italy probably supplies the bulk of the sulphur now used in the Continental war industry. The loss of the Scandinavian deposits might, then, involve only slight reorganization in the German sulphur supply system.

Tungsten. Swedish tungsten output is small relative to that of Portugal, the principal source of German supply. It is, in fact, likely that Germany is not receiving directly any Swedish tungsten; some indirect benefit is, however, derived from the high steel products exported from Sweden to Germany.

Timber and Its Products. Aside from the strategic minerals Scandinavia's largest contribution to the German war effort consists of exports of timber, paper, and wood pulp. These products normally form a substantial part of the exports of the region: in 1938, 21 per cent of the value of the exports of Norway, 35 per cent for Sweden, and fully 78 per cent for Finland. Germany's demand for wood pulp, especially, has been much expanded. Cellulose is an important element in the manufacture of explosives; and, as well, it serves in the manufacture of substitute textiles and substitute fodder. The Scandinavian industry, long developed on export lines, is patently the most important source available for such products as wood pulp, newsprint, paper, and cardboard. Should this area be lost to Germany major consequences might be expected to follow. Adequate alternative sources, economies, and substitutions would be extremely difficult to organize on the requisite scale, especially with respect to wood-pulp, in which Scandinavia is normally the only major surplus area now under German control.

Foodstuffs. At the present time Finland is a deficit food area, drawing some imports from Sweden and from the Reich, largely sugar and bread grains. Sweden is, relatively, a slight surplus area, with the standard of food consumption well maintained, despite rationing. The weakest element in the Swedish position is the shortage of fodder. Norway is suffering a food

FLOW OF STRATEGIC COMMODITIES BETWEEN SCANDINAVIA AND GERMANY



shortage, apparently enforced, in part, as a matter of German policy. Large amounts of fish and fish products are at present being drained from Norway, a large scale exporter in pre-war years. Fish has recently been reported scarce in the large Norwegian cities. The known food shipments from Germany to Scandinavia in 1941 consisted of some 200,000 tons of sugar and 300,000 tons of bread grains. The net contribution of Scandinavia to the German food position, largely in the form of Norwegian fish, can not be regarded as a major German stake in the region.

Shipbuilding. In 1941 Norway and Sweden produced together an estimated 185,000 tons of merchant shipping, amounting to fully 26 per cent of the estimated tonnage turned out from shipyards under German control. This contribution is of importance despite the probable existence of considerable idle shipyard capacity in Europe; the well-run and well-manned Scandinavian yards could not quickly or easily be compensated for.

Industrial Production. Sweden is believed to have received from Germany in 1941 3.2 million tons of coal, 1.6 million tons of coke, 310,000 tons of commercial and coke pig iron. These considerable amounts of strategic materials are required to maintain Sweden's industrial economy. In 1938, 22 per cent of Sweden's exports consisted of semi-manufactured metals and finished machinery, tools, motors, etc. Although no evidence is available on the volume of current exports of this type, it is likely, despite Sweden's rearmament program, that they are not much less than in pre-war years. Germany is thus saved much skilled labor, of a type which is notably scarce on the Continent.

It is difficult to assess in over-all terms the total contribution of Scandinavia to the German war economy. In some cases, such as aluminum or pyrites, relatively minor adjustment would be required if Scandinavia were to be denied. With repect to iron ore, shipbuilding facilities, and even timber, alternative sources of production could be developed, but they would be costly in time, capital, and manpower. The loss of the steel-hardening alloys and copper, in which the Continental position is tight and all resources developed to a maximum, would be very serious indeed, since the possibilities of substitution and economy have already been systematically exhausted. Finally, the wood pulp supplies of Scandinavia are, for Germany, virtually irreplaceable within a reasonable period of time. Thus, although the net contribution of Scandinavia to the German national income may, in monetary terms, be relatively small, the strategic quality of the commodities it now contributes to the German war effort makes it an area of extreme importance.

V. SCANDINAVIA'S POLITICAL POSITION

A. Sweden

Although Sweden is the most powerful of the Scandinavian countries and ninety per cent of its people desire the victory of Great Britain and the United States,[1] it is less likely than Norway or Finland to upset current Nazi plans. In spite of their opposition to Nazi ideals and methods, the Swedes are restrained from joining issue with the Axis on the battlefield by an intense love of peace, the immediate threat of German economic and military pressure, and their secular fear of Russia. Under certain circumstances, Sweden might even enter the War on the Axis side.

The traditional respect and admiration for Germany has been largely dissipated by the Nazi regime. Certain elements in the court and nobility remain pro-German, a few powerful industrialists are Nazi sympathizers, and organizations labeled "Nationalist" or "Socialist," have made some headway in spreading the ideals of Berlin, even in the Army and Navy. Nevertheless, the political centre of gravity in Sweden remains with the profoundly democratic masses. The Social Democratic party, whose core is the trade union membership of the country, has a majority in both houses of the Riksdag and the largest number of ministerial portfolios in the Coalition Government of Per Albin Hansson. The Swedes did not witness with indifference the destruction of democracy and the emasculation of the labor movement in the Third Reich.

The German invasion and subsequent treatment of Norway has immensely strengthened this pre-war anti-Nazi sentiment among all groups in Sweden. The government has lodged many protests against Nazi violence in Norway; it has shown not the slightest intention of recognizing the Quisling puppet regime and has permitted its border guards and other officials to cooperate quite regularly with the Norwegian Underground. Swedish organizations and institutions have been quick to express sympathy with their Norwegian counterparts suffering interference by the Nazis or Quisling. In September 1941, the annual Congress of the Swedish Federation of Labor devoted a special session to commemoration of two Norwegian labor leaders executed by the Nazis. The Swedish clergy have formally declared their solidarity with the stand of their fellow Lutherans in Norway against Quisling's recent interference in matters of religion.

1/ C.O.I., EFFECT AND USES OF SWEDISH NEUTRALITY, Bulletin No. 5, Jan. 13, 1942, p. 5.

The Swedish people have expressed their indignation and horror of Nazi invasion of Norway by contributing generously to the relief of hungry and homeless Norwegians. Above all, the press and public insist, in the face of confiscations of newspapers reporting the details of Nazi sadism in Norwegian prisons and concentration camps, that the Swedes have the absolute right to true information on conditions in Norway in order that they may realize the fate of a people deprived of its freedom and may judge the practical consequences of a political system different from their own.

During these years of rising antipathy for Nazi Germany, Sweden has been building up its military strength. Sweden's armaments program calls for proportionately the most highly mechanized army in the world by 1947; in the meantime, Sweden has been expanding its airforce, its anti-aircraft defenses and its navy. In December 1941, the period of military service was lengthened; more recently, the army has executed a number of partial mobilizations, so that Sweden is more prepared for war in the spring of 1942 than ever before.

Nevertheless, this increase in Sweden's military strength seems designed to ward off the possibility of a clash with Germany rather than to implement Swedish detestation of Nazidom by opening hostilities against Hitler. The Swedes have no territorial ambitions to satisfy, they know that war would seriously lower their high standard of living, their revered King and Prime Minister are particularly averse to bloodshed. Sweden is surrounded by German troops, cut off from help by sea by the German navy, its main cities lie within easy bomber range of German air bases. Probably seventy-five per cent of Sweden's trade is now with Germany, and the Swedish armed forces are partially dependent on Germany for arms and munitions and almost wholly dependent on the Nazis for petroleum products.

The fact of numerous concessions granted to Berlin in the past two years proves Sweden's desire not to become embroiled with its powerful neighbor, and the nature of the concessions reveals how each one has weakened Sweden's power to resist. The Nazis have acquired an intimate knowledge of the Swedish rail system through permission to transport both men and war materials across Sweden to Norway and Finland. They have managed to survey vital defense areas by continually violating the agreement that their courier planes should follow a fixed route across Sweden. They have even gained an intimate knowledge of industrial bombing targets by obtaining permits from the Foreign Office for their specialists to install German equipment delivered to Swedish factories.

In recent months even the sympathy of Sweden for the cause of the United Nations has been somewhat shaken by the apparent willingness of the British to accede to Stalin's demands concerning Russia's future western boundary. Based on the experience of two and a half centuries of Russian expansion to the northwest, Sweden's most fundamental emotion in foreign affairs has been its fear of Russian land hunger. This fear has been strengthened by the general horror of Communism in Sweden.[1] Swedish action bore witness to this sentiment during the Winter War, when Swedish volunteers, Swedish arms and Swedish money poured into Finland; since the renewal of hostilities, Sweden has favored Finland's recovery of the strategic territory lost in the Peace of Moscow.[2]

Events in England have now aroused this latent Russophobia in Sweden. Goebbel's version of Eden's visit to Moscow, that Britain had acquiesced in the Bolshevization of the continent, seemed to the Swedes confirmed by Sir Stafford Cripps' speech at Bristol on February 8. For asserting that the U.S.S.R. would emerge from the war the strongest power in Europe and that a Soviet would be installed in Berlin, the Secretary-General of the Swedish Foreign Office considered that Cripps "ought to be awarded the highest German decoration for the assistance he is giving Goebbels." The contention that a desparate Britain was offering to meet almost any demand from the Kremlin as the price of Russia's continued resistance to Germany spread from the Nazi to the Conservative and Liberal press. *Svenska Dagbladet* pointedly denied the claim of the *Times* leading article that Russian war aims were in no way incompatible with European -- and hence, Swedish -- security as projected in the "Atlantic Charter."

This outbreak in the Swedish press gave point to the contention of a well-informed American observer in Stockholm that a Russian advance on the Finnish front might cause the downfall of the peace-loving Coalition Government in Sweden, open the way to power to the small group of pro-Germans in Sweden, and rally the masses to the essentially pro-German policy of armed assistance to the Finns. Shortly after the furor over Cripps' speeches, King Gustaf sharply reminded the United Nations that Sweden was not at the beck and call of London or Washington; he

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1/ Only one member of the upper house and three of the lower house of the Riksdag are Communists. Recently acquired Communist control over several important unions in the port of Goteborg does not seem to indicate any wide increase of sentiment for the Soviet system in Sweden.

2/ Cf. C.O.I., Western and Eastern European Sections, "Swedish Opinion of the Finnish Problem," Jan. 28, 1942.

sent his pro-Nazi grandson to Finland to bestow the highest decoration which Sweden can confer on Field Marshall Baron Mannerheim.

B. Norway

Nazi Germany has thoroughly alienated at least ninety-five per cent of the Norwegian people. Under no circumstances would these victims of Nazi aggression collaborate with their conquerors. On the other hand, even the carefully organized Norwegian Underground is in no position to throw off the Nazi yoke, or even to interfere seriously with the use of Norwegian bases against the Allies' northern supply route to Russia. In spite of intense provocation, Norway intends to hold its fire until aid arrives from the Western Democracies.

Ever since the German conquest, the Norwegians have steadfastly resisted Nazi *Gleichschaltung* under Reichskommissar Josef Terboven. Well over a year ago, the Norwegian Supreme Court resigned in a body in protest against unconstitutional juridical procedure. More recently, the reorganization of a number of professional associations and trade unions along lines compatible with the "New Order" has resulted in wholesale resignations or refusals to pay dues.

Even more loathed and hated than the Nazis are Major Vidkun Quisling and his party of National Union (*Nasjonal Samling*). Although all other political parties have been dissolved, Quisling has succeeded in enlisting a scant one per cent of the population; he maintains a circulation for his paper, *Fritt Folk*, largely by forcing all municipal offices to subscribe. Only one of eighteen provincial governors proved ready to serve under him. His elevation to the newly created position of Ministerpresident of the puppet government on February 1, may mean that the Nazis are washing their hands of Norwegian civil government quite as much as that they are putting their stamp of official approval on a man for whom they apparently have little regard.[1]

Since his appointment to the highest post in the puppet government, Quisling has lost ground with both Germans and Norwegians. His February trip to Berlin failed to win the coveted treaty of peace with Hitler; his policy with regard to education and the Church in Norway has done more than any other single thing to unite Norwegians in their resistance to

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1/ C.O.I., Western European Section, *Quisling as Ministerpresident*, Feb. 9, 1942, pp. 2-3.

the "New Order." Touched off by the arrest of Dean Fjellbu of Trondheim Cathedral and by a decree that all Norwegians between the ages of ten and eighteen must participate in the youth service of the *Nasjonal Samling*, Quisling's measures have resulted in the almost universal resignation of clergymen and teachers. Following the example of their Bishops, practically every pastor of the Lutheran Church, in which ninety-seven per cent of the population is officially registered, has resigned his state post. After protests by the University professors and boycotts by the students, nine out of the ten thousand teachers in Norway have also resigned.

Quisling has been entirely incapable of handling this situation. He has closed the schools for a month, "for lack of fuel," but can hardly expect to force back the old staff by cutting off their pay, since the Underground is apparently prepared to salary the recalcitrant teachers for as much as three years. In the meantime, they continue to hold classes in their homes without the government daring to interfere. Quisling is reported to have set up a new Church council and to have taken over the headship of the Church himself, but he has shown no ability to reopen a thousand parish churches. According to reports reaching Sweden, he has even backed water on the youth service issue, allowing it to be understood that such "service" will mean only the payment of small dues and attendance at two or three meetings yearly.

Not only is Norway seething with general resistance against the Nazis and Quisling, but the Norwegians have organized a remarkably efficient Underground organization. Under direction from London, the Underground is at present primarily concerned with the acquisition and dissemination of information. Using hidden radios, its members gather news for publication in widely circulated clandestine newspapers. Constant courier service across the North Sea passes on special directions to Underground leaders and keeps London informed of conditions in Norway. The Underground also maintains connections with agents in Denmark and Germany and specializes in organizing the escape of young Norwegians to Great Britain.

At the same time, the Underground is preparing for the day of Allied invasion. It has concealed arms and ammunition remaining in Norwegian hands at the end of the 1940 campaign and has brought over more light arms from Britain. The members have been assigned specific tasks, such as cutting German communication lines and hampering transport. Upon completion of their sabotage duties, they will withdraw to the mountains, where they can defend themselves with the weapons at their disposal until a successful landing by the invading forces makes available additional equipment.

All this opposition to Nazi rule and these preparations for armed revolt, do not, however, threaten Germany's present strategy in Scandinavia. It is the Quisling government, not the German occupying forces, which is embarrassed by the uncooperativeness of the Norwegian civilians. The sabotage activities of the Underground are not to be unleashed until Norway is invaded by British or American forces. Norwegians, who six months ago looked forward to such an invasion in the spring of 1942, now hardly dare hope for it this summer. Commando raids, while in theory a reminder to the Norwegians that they are not forgotten, have become increasingly embarrassing to the Underground, since they offer an excellent excuse to the Germans for widespread arrests in reprisal.[1] In any event, they are only local in character and do not afford an opportunity for the Norwegians themselves to hamper Hitler's plans.

The Norwegians have, to be sure, ample provocation for turning upon their conquerors at once. The food situation, though not desperate, is certainly serious. Having virtually denuded Norway of eggs, butter, cheese and meat, the Germans have also, by direct requisitioning or restrictions on the consumption of fuels, drastically curtailed the supply of the four staples -- bread, milk, fish and potatoes. Swedish physicians have declared the present Norwegian diet inadequate for proper nourishment. The food situation and the fuel shortage make thoughts of another winter almost unbearable.

Although Nazi rule in Norway has been accompanied by far less bloodshed than in other countries -- hardly more than one hundred executions are reported -- arrests, torture, executions and confiscations of property are rapidly increasing. By February 1942, some four to five thousand Norwegians were in prison or concentration camps; the Germans had instituted the practice of arresting former Norwegian officers, apparently merely as a preventive measure, and shipping them off to Germany; hundreds of school teachers had been sent to labor camps in the far north. Well-authenticated accounts of Gestapo and Quisling torture have reached Sweden and England. Recently the Nazis announced that ten hostages would be seized for every man who escaped to England, and Quisling proclaimed that he would confiscate the property of any individual or institution judged to be an enemy of the state. In addition to suffering these measures of violence, the Norwegians were losing their nuclei

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1/ According to one well-informed source, the Royal Norwegian Government has formally requested the British to remove the whole population from spots where raids are made, in order to protect them from indiscriminate reprisals.

of resistance, as organization after organization, from the Boy Scouts to the trade unions and the Lutheran Church, was either dissolved or reconstituted under Quisling leadership.

Nevertheless, the Norwegians seem unlikely to risk ultimate failure by premature and unaided revolt. The recent reign of terror is reported to have strengthened rather than weakened Norway's resolve to hold out. The Underground, itself well disciplined, has apparently convinced the Norwegian people that they must suffer in patience until deliverance arrives from outside. In sum, Hitler's military strategy for the spring and summer of 1942 can disregard the hostility of the Norwegian populace provided that the German ships, planes and men in Norway can prevent a real invasion by the forces of Britain or the United States.

C. Finland[1]

Paradoxically, Germany has more cause for apprehension with regard to its current strategy from Finland, its ally, than from neutral Sweden or conquered Norway. Finland is near exhaustion, uncertain of gaining its objectives and distrustful, even contemptuous of the Nazis. Offensive action on the part of the Finns has virtually ceased, and Germany's influence seems on the wane. In this war-weary frame of mind, Finland fights on only from the conviction that without more fighting and without German aid it will be crushed by the hated Russians. Germany is currently in a position to exploit this fear; both because of the presence of German troops on Finnish soil, and because of Finland's partial dependence on food supplies released by Germany from the Continental grain supplies she controls.

Finland is short of manpower as well as food supplies. Twice in three years, first in the Winter War and again since June 1941, Finland has lost probably 25,000 to 30,000 men killed and double that number wounded. And continued full mobilization has adversely affected the difficult food situation. Finland was short of essential foodstuffs even before the present war started; the country had never been self-sufficient in bread grains and cattle fooder; the peace of Moscow deprived Finland of ten per cent of its arable land without correspondingly reducing the population; the 1940 harvest was far below normal; and the Russians failed to live up to their

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1/ The Finnish situation has been treated at length in a forthcoming report of the Eastern European Section of the Coordinator of Information.

trade agreement for shipping food to Finland. Now foreign supplies are further cut off, and the reduced manpower available on the farms has meant a severe reduction in last fall's and the current spring's plowing.

The serious character of the food situation in urban Finland was strikingly illustrated in late February, when the failure of ice-bound German grain ships to arrive in Helsinki forced the Finnish Government to order the confiscation for immediate consumption of all the seed rye and one-half the seed wheat previously allocated for the 1942 fall sowing. Besides the bread shortage, urban consumption of fats, sugar, meat, eggs, milk and fish has been reduced from 28 to 80 percent below normal according to the official rations; but the rations are often unavailable, especially to city workers who neither grow their own food nor can afford to purchase on the black market.

The lack of food constitutes an important but by no means the only cause of the growing war weariness. The civil populace has suffered from a severe fuel shortage; this winter workers' homes in Helsinki were heated to an average temperature of only forty-five degrees Fahrenheit. The government and the general staff have begun to doubt the possibility of achieving the goal set by Field Marshal Baron Mannerheim in his Second Order of the Day on July 11 last, namely, the conquest of Eastern or Soviet Karelia. The rank and file of the army has become increasingly sceptical of German military prowess. They are aware of German reverses elsewhere on the eastern front, they have witnessed the very poor showing of the Nazi troops this past winter in Finland, and they have watched the German soldier, his equipment pitifully inadequate, barter five cans of pork for a woolen sweater or two bottles of rum for a sheepskin cap.

As a result of these hardships and doubts, Finnish morale dropped steadily with the beginning of winter, the failure to take Leningrad and the entry of the United States into the war. This deterioration of Finland's fighting spirit first threatened the Coalition Government with the desertion of the Social Democrats, then spread among the troops, and finally penetrated to the general staff, which is now reported doubtful that victory can be won and convinced that Finland must cease fighting before the end of the present year. For months the Finns have failed to launch any offensive against the Russians, in particular, to attack the vital rail junction of Sorokka. They have, on the contrary, manifested increasing resistance to Nazi pressure, refusing to have German soldiers take furloughs in Helsinki, informing Berlin that Finland could

not remain indifferent to the character of German rule in Estonia, and declining to close the American Legation.

Finland continues to fight because it believes the alternative to be national disaster in the form of domination by Soviet Russia. The Finns have completely single-track minds on this subject, stubbornly persisting in the belief that their war for national security is at the same time of service to civilization in its struggle with barbarism and yet completely separate from the contest among the great powers. This all-pervading Russophobia plays into the hands of the Germans, who can be certain that the Finns will continue to bear extraordinary hardships rather than open the way for a Russian advance.

The Nazis possess an additional lever in the fact that no other country has been in a position to furnish minimum food import requirements. Sweden, which has shipped important quantities of food and materials to Finland in recent years, is itself running short of supplies and loath to extend further credits. In December 1941, the Germans obtained Finland's adherence to the anti-Comintern Pact by the mere threat of withholding 75,000 tons of rye grain. A few weeks ago a member of the Finnish Cabinet, commenting on the fact that his country was dependent on German good will for ninety-three per cent of its imports, likened Finland to a trapped mouse.

Finland cannot escape from the trap -- dares not withdraw from the war -- until it is convinced that a negotiated peace will meet its two great current *desiderata*, food and security from Russia. Even the present government might be ready to consider something less than the acquisition of Eastern Karelia as a means of gaining the necessary security. In November 1941, when Finland rather curtly refused to admit the American view that the safety of the Murman railway was a matter of international concern, the Finns expected the imminent fall of Leningrad and the defeat of Russia. Since then, the military picture from the Finnish point of view has considerably deteriorated, and the army has discovered that the "liberated" Eastern Karelians are anything but overjoyed at Finnish rule. Should the German spring campaign bog down in its early stages, the Finnish High Command might be satisfied with the reestablishment of the 1939 boundaries.

Even if President Ryti, Baron Mannerheim and the Coalition Government as at present constituted should balk at such a compromise when offered by an outside power, they might have to yield to pressure from the Finnish Social Democrats. This party is the most powerful single political group in the country.

Its public opposition to the annexation of Eastern Karelia has helped to prevent the government from avowing that annexation as a war aim. Moreover, this party, as representative of the Finnish trade unions, is especially resentful of Nazi influence in Finnish affairs; and its members, predominately city workers, are those who have suffered most acutely from the hardships attendant upon continuing this unprofitable war.